Is assortative matching efficient?
Second, if group sizes vary, assortative matching may not be efficient even though complementarities are present, unless particular functional form assumptions are imposed.
What is assortative matching economics?
Assortative mating is the process by which people of similar backgrounds, such as educational attainment or financial means, select a partner. Over the past half-century, there has been an increase in positive assortative mating within the marriage market.
What is the importance of assortative mating?
Evolutionary theory predicts that positive assortative mating-the tendency of similar individuals to mate with each other-plays a key role for speciation by generating reproductive isolation between diverging populations.
What is an example of assortative mating?
assortative mating, in human genetics, a form of nonrandom mating in which pair bonds are established on the basis of phenotype (observable characteristics). For example, a person may choose a mate according to religious, cultural, or ethnic preferences, professional interests, or physical traits.
Is assortative mating true?
Assortative mating in animals has been observed with respect to body size and color. Size-related assortative mating is prevalent across many species of vertebrates and invertebrates. It has been found in the simultaneous hermaphrodites such as the land snail Bradybaena pellucida.
Why is assortative mating important?
Assortative mating is known to increase population variance for traits that are involved in mate choice; thus, the ancestry components that drive assortative mating in a given population are expected to show higher overall variance among individual genomes.
What statement best describes assortative mating?
What statement best describes assortative mating? Individuals with similar phenotypes are more likely to mate.
Is the stable match of the risk-sharing matching game negative assortative?
For the arbitrary distribution of risk sizes, the stable match of the risk-sharing matching game is negative assortative on agents’ levels of systematic risk exposure if for ∀ k 12, k 21 > 1 and ∀ u ‾, (37) V ( k 12, V ( 1, u ‾)) ≥ V ( k 12 + k 21 − 1, V ( k 21, u ‾)) The proof can be found in Legros and Newman (2007).
Do risk-sharing matching games admit a transferable expected utility representation?
Schulhofer-Wohl (2006) showed that the risk-sharing matching games admit a transferable expected utility representation if and only if preferences are in the class of identical shape harmonic absolute risk aversion (ISHARA).
What is positive and negative assortative matching?
Under a positive/negative assortative matching (PAM/NAM), the most risky male is matched with the most/least risky female, the second-most risky male is matched with the second-most/least risky female, and so on. The formal definition of the equilibrium matching pattern is stated as follows:
What is the stable match?
The formal definition of the equilibrium matching pattern is stated as follows: A stable match is positive ( negative) assortative if and only if for any i, i ′, j and j ′ such that i and i ′ are matched with j and j ′ respectively, we have i ′ ≥ i ⟺ j ′ ≥ ( ≤) j. 3. Stable match and social risk premium